What “Form” Transforms?
A Constructive-Developmental Approach to Transformative Learning

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Consider the case of Peter and Lynn as they tumble out of bed. “These days,” each could say, “my work is too much with me.” Different as their work is, they have noticed that in each of their jobs a similar circumstance has stirred them up.

Lynn has been at Highland Junior High School for twelve years, originally as an English teacher. Three years ago she became chair of the English department, and last year it was decided that chairpersons would become part of the principal’s newly formed Leadership Council. The school had decided to adopt a site-based management philosophy in which the responsibility and authority for running the school would no longer be vested only in the principal, Carolyn Evans, but shared mainly among the principal and the faculty or its representatives.

Peter has worked at BestRest Incorporated for nineteen years. A bedding manufacturer with twelve regional factories, shipping to furniture and department stores, BestRest hired Peter during the summers while he was still in college. He caught the eye of Anderson Wright, then a plant manager, who became his mentor. As Anderson rose through the ranks he brought Peter along. Eventually, when he became a corporate vice president, he put Peter in charge of an independent product line. Peter enjoyed the continuing close association with Anderson, whom he consulted frequently and easily.
But life became more complicated for Peter when Wright decided to make the independent product line a separate company division and Peter its new head. “If you’re game, Peter,” said Wright, “and I think you’re ready, I want you to think of the new line as a company on its own—SafeSleep Products—and I want you to run it. I want it to be your baby and I want you to think of me more as your banker. Plans, directions, and initiatives will come from you, not me. I’ll review your plans like a banker would, evaluate their soundness, and extend credit or not. But if I do, it’s still your project that’s getting funded, not mine; it’s your plan that’s rising or falling, not mine. It’ll be your responsibility to come through, make your payments, make a go of your business. Whaddaya think? You wanna be president of BestRest’s SafeSleep division?” Peter could hear the excitement in Anderson’s voice, his pleasure in offering Peter what Anderson clearly regarded as a wonderful present. He could feel how much Anderson loved the place to which he had just moved the relationship. So Peter, without hesitation or conscious deliberation and true to his deepest commitment where Anderson was concerned, moved himself to rejoin Anderson in this new place. “I love it,” said Peter, like the spouse of a newly restationed military officer, happy to be reunited with one’s partner but looking in sheer terror at the unfamiliar surroundings and wondering what life here could possibly be like.

Thus Lynn and Peter, the teacher and the business executive who seldom feel their work has anything in common, find themselves contending with a similar circumstance. One job is service oriented, the other product oriented; one is nonprofit, the other for profit; one involves a predominantly female environment, the other a male environment; one has an organizational culture distinguished by gentleness, safety, and nurture, the other a culture distinguished by competition, maneuvering, and results. Yet Lynn’s and Peter’s work lives are both out of equilibrium for the same reason: worker-participation initiatives have recast the issues of responsibility, ownership, and authority at work. One of the central aspirations of such initia-
tives is surely the revitalization and increased morale of the workforce. But no one would know that by looking at Lynn and Peter. Both are miserable and demoralized about the changes at work. Let’s take a closer look to find out why.

“I can give you an example of why this thing is not working at Highland,” Lynn says. “Probably every department chair and most of the faculty would agree that there are big flaws in the way we do faculty evaluations. First of all, except for the few first-year teachers, faculty evaluations are based on two class visits by the principal. Two visits, that’s it. And it’s the principal who does them. They are announced visits, so teachers end up preparing for a performance, which they resent and which is a lousy basis for evaluation. The teachers don’t feel that the principal gets a fair sample of their work. The kids know what’s going on and act weird—they’re on ‘good behavior’ too, and completely unspontaneous. The principal writes up a generally innocuous report, which the teacher then pours over like an old Kremilnologist trying to detect the hidden meaning in some routine public communiqué. Usually there is no hidden meaning. The principal is just discharging a duty that she finds as unpleasant and unrewarding as the teachers. Nobody is learning a thing, but at least the principal can tell the central office that ‘everyone’s been evaluated’ and she has the paperwork, neatly typed in the files, to prove it.

“I went along with this like everyone else, but by the time I’d become the English department chair I’d begun to form some very different ideas about evaluation—about everything, really. I got the idea that the school should be a learning place for everyone, that we’re supposed to be experts on learning, that we could evaluate everything we’re doing on the basis of whether it’s prelearning or not. I know at home my own kids are unbelievably aware of what Peter and I do; we teach them more by modeling than by explaining. I decided that if we want kids to be learning in school it would help them if we modeled learning ourselves. It was actually some version of this that got me excited about being on the Leadership
Council in the first place. I had some different ideas about faculty evaluation. I wanted to return the emphasis to learning, not file-filling. I wanted the teachers to identify what their learning agenda was and what they needed to fulfill it. And I wanted to use my chairmanship to advocate that the administrators be interested in supporting the teachers’ learning. Especially, once the teacher was tenured, as most of our faculty is, I wanted the principal to get out of the evaluation business. I felt it was better handled within the departments. I thought Carolyn was a good administrator and that that was an honorable profession—after all, I'm married to one—but that it was different from being a schoolteacher. I felt that she was less effective when she crossed over from her profession into mine. My feeling is that a good hospital administrator runs the hospital well, but she doesn't tell the surgeon where to cut.

"So when Carolyn proposed sight-based management to our faculty I admired her for being willing to let some other voices come into the leadership of the school, but I wasn't thinking, 'Good, now we're going to take over.' I don't want to take over. I don't want to be the principal. But I don't want Carolyn being the department chair either, and I felt that we had a better chance of clearing these things up in group discussions, like we'd have on the council, than in one-on-one meetings in Carolyn's office.

"The whole thing started to fall apart for me this semester around just this issue of faculty evaluation, and it wasn't even my initiative. It's not as if we don't all know each other pretty well by now, but when Alan—he's the history chair—brought in his proposal, it was a complete surprise to me. It was not, as I think Carolyn was suggesting, some kind of conspiracy.

"Alan's proposal, basically, was that the history department be allowed to run a one-year experiment on evaluation. He wanted to get the performance-anxiety, test-taking dimension out of it. He wanted people to have the option of entering supervisory relationships with him or a few other senior members of the department that would really be more consultative than supervisory. No write-ups or evaluations of the teacher by the supervisor/consultant. The supervisor/consultant would, in effect, be 'hired' by the faculty member to advance the faculty member's learning goals. The teacher could 'fire' the consultant without consequences. No visits by the principal. If the teacher wanted the consultant to visit some classes for the teacher's purposes that could certainly be arranged, but not for the purpose of entering something in the faculty member's file. No file entries for one year. Try to get a sense of how the faculty used it and how much and what kind of learning was going on, but all anonymously, evaluating the experiment, not the teachers. That was basically it.

"I loved the idea, of course. I was envious that I hadn't thought of it myself. It seemed like a good way of putting into operation my idea that the faculty member should run his evaluation, that the evaluation should be aimed at learning, not putting on a show, that the chair could serve as a consultant and a resource to self-directed learning.

"We've now had three long discussions about this on the council, and we still haven't had the first word about the real merits of Alan's proposal. As I now realize I should have been more aware, the issue for Carolyn had less to do with promoting faculty learning than with the precedent it sets about accountability in general and accountability to her specifically. Stop visits by the principal? Let the faculty decide what they need to learn? No evaluations for the files by anybody? These didn't go down easily with Carolyn. Rather than take her usual stance of speaking last in a conversation in order to give everyone a chance to weigh in on the matter, she was the first to speak after Alan made his proposal, and what she had to say pretty much silenced the rest of us. She didn't identify any merits in the proposal. She didn't even acknowledge the implicit problems the proposal was at least trying to address. She didn't present her problems with the proposal as just her problems, which could still leave open for discussion whether these needed to determine the group's actual decision. She didn't invite anyone to help
her with her problems with the proposal. She just said basically, ‘This is something we can’t do.’

‘I’m not proud of the way I responded, but it was just such a unilateral and imperial stance for her to take, and I guess I got mad. What I said was, “Why, Carolyn? Is it illegal what Alan is proposing?” and everyone else laughed and I could see that Carolyn was very angry. I hadn’t meant it exactly the way it came out. I didn’t mean she was out of line to object to the proposal. I was reacting to the way she framed it. I meant that Carolyn is the principal, and where the council strays into areas that may violate civil ordinances or the district charter, she has every right to take a unilateral position. But where the council is not straying into this kind of territory I didn’t feel she had the right to just shut down the conversation. At the time I attributed my overreaction and sarcasm to the fact this was an especially important issue to me personally, and I resented how it was being dismissed. That didn’t justify my sarcasm, but it did dignify it somehow.

‘Anyhow, after that council session Carolyn asked to meet with me in her office, and she read me the riot act: How could I do that to her? Didn’t I know how much she counted on my loyalty? Didn’t I realize how powerful I was as a department chair, and that to take such a doubting view when she had clearly committed herself was terribly undermining? That she thought of us as partners, that we had worked so well together all these years, and how it was even more important with SBM that we read each other’s signals well and be a good team. I had to say, ‘Whoa, Carolyn, time out, I’m having too many reactions to all this.’

‘We ended up having a good conversation, actually, one of our best in years, but it was really difficult. I had to tell her I thought it was unfair of her to trade on my loyalty to her, that that felt like a risky business. I told her I did respect her, and that we were friends, and I was grateful to her for her support to me professionally over the years, but that I was sure she was not interested in a friend who was a clone or in promoting a colleague because she was a yes-man.

I had to puzzle through all the different ‘teams’ we were on because I felt that I was still very much a team player even when I disagreed with her, although she seemed to feel I was abandoning the team if I disagreed. This got us into the whole SBM, Leadership Council thing, and whether that was itself a team, and what were the expectations about how we functioned as members of that council. Carolyn broke down and cried and said she was finding SBM terribly hard, that she had had no idea what she was getting into, that half the time she had nightmares that the school was going to fall apart because there was more chaos than leadership, and the other half of the time she had nightmares that the school was getting along too well without her running things and that she was slowly being relieved of her job, that SBM was about gradually making the principal irrelevant.”

Were Peter to tell us what his new role as head of a division really felt like he might say something like this: “Honestly? It’s definitely a different ball game! What game is it? Well, let’s see. I guess you could say before I was president, I was playing a game of catch. Anderson would throw things at me and I’d catch them. I’d throw things back at him and he’d catch them. A good long game of catch. And now? Now I’d say I’m a juggler. There’s not one ball, there are five, and then there are ten, and then there are fifteen! People keep tossing more in to me to add to those I’m juggling. But I’m not throwing to anyone. I’m just throwing them into the air. As soon as I get them I just toss them back into the air. And my job as the juggler is to keep them all going up there, not let any of them drop to the ground.

“You couldn’t believe the number of things that come across my desk. ‘Anderson says to take this to you now.’ ‘Anderson says he’s not the guy on this anymore; you are.’ I bet I heard that twenty times the first month we set up SafeSleep. If it wasn’t one thing, it was another. You have to deal with a lot of people’s feelings about this change. Everybody thought the company concept for SafeSleep was a hot idea when Anderson proposed it, but now that we’re actually
doing it, a lot of people aren't so sure. I told Lynn the other night I'm not even sure Anderson's so sure at this point. People keep asking me how I feel about the change, but the truth is, I don't have time to think about how I feel about it because I spend half my day dealing with how everybody else feels about it.

"Take Ted, for example. He's one of our salespeople. I've known Ted ten years in this business. His son and my Matthew are like brothers; they grew up in each other's homes. I probably see Ted's son as much as my own. Ted's putting a lot of pressure on me not to separate him from the SafeSleep line. Ted's a mattress salesman and a damn good one. He does excellent work for his customers. His customers are furniture stores and the mattress departments of two large chains of department stores. They love him and he loves them. The SafeSleep line got its start by accident, or what Anderson called 'entrepreneurial jujitsu,' turning a weakness into a strength. New government codes mandated that we manufacture flame-retardant mattresses and it cost millions of dollars to set up the capacity. Since we had the capacity, Anderson reasoned, why not use it for other things, too? Presto! The SafeSleep line. But originally these products were just an extra that the mattress salespeople offered their furniture stores. The store used them as 'sweeteners' to sell their customers our top-of-the-line mattresses. They'd throw in a king-size quilt along with the purchase of a king-size mattress and box spring. Stuff like that. Everybody was happy. The furniture store's customer liked the freebie; the store liked the mattress sale; our salespeople liked the increased mattress orders they got from the stores. And that's just the problem. Everybody was happy. 'So why are you ruining a nice thing?' Ted wants to know. 'Peter, I'm family,' he says to me. 'And Harold is not,' which is true. 'So why are you letting this guy take the bread off my table?' he says.

"I hired Harold soon after I became president of SafeSleep because Harold had sales experience in bedclothes. He was the first nonmattress salesperson in the place, and I thought we needed that for the new company. He's turned out to be a dynamo. The guy's got more ideas per square inch than I've ever seen, and most of them make sense. But they're also making some people, like Ted, mad. And I'm not so sure Anderson's very keen about him either.

"Harold's take was that BestRest was choking SafeSleep, that the best reason for setting up SafeSleep as a separate company was that its growth was stunted in the shadow of the mattress company. Furniture stores, he said, were not the place to be selling pajamas and not even the best place to sell quilts. He said our products were better than premium giveaways and should be promoted on their own merits. We should be placing them in the bed linen and pajama departments of our department stores, not the furniture and mattress departments. We should be making flame-retardants for grown-ups, not just kids. Grown-ups smoke in bed and are more likely to set themselves on fire than kids are. And on and on. It all made sense to me, but whenever you start talking about doing things differently people get worried about what it means for them. Harold said our real problem was that BestRest had a national sales force of mattress salespeople, not pajama salespeople. BestRest's customers were furniture stores, not pajama stores, and the conventions, shows, trade press, and brand recognition for BestRest are all oriented to the furniture trade, not bedclothes, white sales, or children's clothing. His view is that if SafeSleep is really going to be its own company, it needs its own identity, its own purpose, and its own sales force selling to its own customers. It has to get out of the hip pocket of BestRest.

"The problem with this is that as soon as you pull the SafeSleep line away from the mattress sales force, a guy like Ted, who has gotten a lot of mileage out of it, yells 'ouch.' I think Harold's basically right when he says that you can't establish the quality of a product by giving it away in one place and hoping to sell it somewhere else. But Ted's probably right, too, that his mattress orders will go down, at least for a while, if we pull the SafeSleep line from him, because that's what's already happened where we've begun to separate the line from the mattress business. Ted's not just worried about his volume, he's
worried about his bonus benefits. He's doing one helluva job making me feel guilty, that it will be on my head to explain to both of our wives why he and Ada won't be along on this winter's 'customer cruise' since he'll be coming in under quota and won't qualify for the trip. Why doesn't he go make his stores feel guilty? It's their fault if they short-order him, not mine. But the truth is, Lynn and I had dinner with Ted and Ada last week and it was not a good time. You could feel the tension. By the end of the evening, I'd gone from feeling bad that I was making them both unhappy to being angry at them for making me so miserable. What right did they have making me feel guilty? I'm trying to run a business and they're upset about the Bahamas. Give me a break!

"I consider Ted and Anderson two of my best friends and if this new job ruins both of these friendships I won't be surprised. When Anderson offered me the presidency he said it was a way to move our relationship to a whole new level, that we were becoming true colleagues, that he couldn't wait to see what would come of it. It's a whole new level all right! I guess if you never want to see a guy again you should become true colleagues with him! But I know if you ask Anderson he'll say he's just as available, that it's me, that I don't call. And that's true. I just stay away from him these days and figure that when he needs to tell me something he will. I'd leave our meetings feeling as if we'd talked a lot but I had no clearer idea where I was when I left than when I'd come in. I'd run my sense of what was going on with SafeSleep or what needed to happen by him, and I'd have no idea where he stood on any of it. Half the time I felt he couldn't care less and had lost interest in the whole thing. Then he'd make some kind of comment like 'Nobody smokes anymore' when I'd bring up Harold's idea about an adult pajama line, and I'd spend a week trying to figure out which way the wind was blowing.

"It was very clear that he didn't want to be asked straight out what he thought we should do. It was very clear that he wanted me to have a plan. But it was also clear that he liked some plans better than others. He'd dump all over a lot of Harold's ideas. I'd leave his office and find myself down on Harold for the next three days. I'd feel that he was trying to warn me away from Harold but wouldn't come right out and say so. What I'd always liked about Anderson was that he was a straight shooter. He'd always tell you exactly what he wanted, and what he said he wanted turned out to be exactly what he really did want. You didn't have to decode him. I want Anderson to sign on to my plans and he keeps saying, 'If this is where you want to put your chips.' I feel that he's putting me out on a limb all by myself and saying he's down on the ground cheering for me. A fat lot of help that is! When I tell him it must be nice for him to be out of it he gets annoyed and says, 'Don't think for a minute I'm out of it! You're turning SafeSleep from a cute afterthought into a corporate factor, and if it goes down the tubes they'll be asking me what happened.' And then I feel even less reassured because now I'm responsible for Anderson's not getting hurt. That's a lot of what's different about being the president. I've got to worry about Ted. I've got to worry about Anderson. The balls keep dropping into my hands and I keep throwing them back up into the air and somehow it's all supposed to keep going and no one is supposed to fall to the ground. My arms are getting awfully tired, and I'm not exactly sure what I did to deserve this wonderful job."

Peter and Lynn are dealing with what we might call the hidden curriculum of adult life as it expresses itself here in the world of work. If we were to look at the whole of contemporary culture in the West as a kind of school, and consider adult roles as the courses in which we are enrolled, most adults have a full and demanding schedule. The “courses” of parenting, partnering, working, and living in an increasingly diverse society are demanding ones, yet most adults are enrolled in all of them. What does it take to succeed in these courses? What is the nature of the change struggling students would have to undergo to become successful students?
These are the kinds of questions I posed in my book In Over Our Heads (1994), of which Peter and Lynn are the heroes. In the last several years since the book has been published, I have heard the thinking of a few thousand adult educators—faculty and administrators—about Peter and Lynn in various workshops, institutes, and summer conferences all over the United States. Most people see Lynn as more capable and handling better the new demands at work. Although people often want to claim that Peter has a number of external problems that Lynn does not—he has more at stake, they say; his organizational culture is less supportive, they say; he has a male boss, they say, who isn’t as open to conversation as Lynn’s boss—most people do not attribute Lynn’s greater success to these external advantages alone.

Without using the terms, people find Lynn more capable in each of four familiar quadrants of the psychological self: cognitive (“Lynn seems to have more of a mind of her own”; “She has a Big Picture and an overall ‘take’ on things, but Peter seems lost and overwhelmed”), affective (“Lynn takes responsibility for how she feels, understands why she feels that way and can even step out of being controlled by her feelings”; “Peter seems swamped and overrun by his feelings”; “He blames other people for how he feels”), interpersonal (“Peter is like a victim”; “He’s too dependent”; “Lynn is able to set clear boundaries in a complicated multidimensional relationship like the one she has with her boss and friend, but Peter is not, and seems run by his relationships to people at work who are his friends”), and intrapersonal (“Peter doesn’t seem very self-reflective”; “He’s thinking about what other people are thinking, and she’s thinking about her own thinking”).

What sort of transformation would it take for Peter to exercise the capabilities people see in Lynn? What capabilities does Peter already possess and what prior transformations in his learning might their presence imply? Why don’t his present capabilities serve him in his new circumstances?

Transformational Learning and the Problem of Its Success

Some academic writing—that which is most frequently parodied and ridiculed—uses obscure language to hide the fact that nothing terribly original is being expressed. Some unappealingly obscure academic language is in the service of genuinely new ideas; the thinkers are just better at creating new thinking than at devising the language required to express it. And on occasion a richly heuristic set of novel ideas finds an appealing language for its expression and the field takes off. In psychology, Erikson’s concepts of identity and identity crisis are examples. Gardner’s multiple intelligence is a more recent one. And surely transformational learning is another. Jack Mezirow’s genius and our good fortune derive from this double-header ability to provide accessible new language in service of valuable new ideas. But as Mezirow well knows, this kind of success spawns its own problems. As Brookfield notes in this volume, the language can become so appealing it begins to be used for myriad purposes; its meaning can be distorted, its distinct ideas lost. It can take on quasi-religious qualities, in this case of dramatic “conversion.” Transformation begins to refer to any kind of change or process at all. Piaget (1954) distinguished between assimilative processes, in which new experience is shaped to conform to existing knowledge structures, and accommodative processes, in which the structures themselves change in response to new experience. Ironically, as the language of transformation is more widely assimilated it risks losing its genuinely transformative potential!

In this chapter I try to protect the genuinely landscape-altering potential in the concept of transformational learning by suggesting several of its distinct features that I believe need to be more explicit:

1. Transformational kinds of learning need to be more clearly distinguished from informational kinds of learning, and each
needs to be recognized as valuable in any learning activity, discipline, or field.

2. The form that is undergoing transformation needs to be better understood; if there is no form there is no transformation.

3. At the heart of a form is a way of knowing (what Mezirow calls a “frame of reference”); thus genuinely transformational learning is always to some extent an epistemological change rather than merely a change in behavioral repertoire or an increase in the quantity or fund of knowledge.

4. Even as the concept of transformational learning needs to be narrowed by focusing more explicitly on the epistemological, it needs to be broadened to include the whole life span; transformational learning is not the province of adulthood or adult education alone.

5. Adult educators with an interest in transformational learning may need a better understanding of their students’ current epistemologies so as not to create learning designs that unwittingly presuppose the very capacities in the students their designs might seek to promote.

6. Adult educators may better discern the nature of learners’ particular needs for transformational learning by better understanding not only their students’ present epistemologies but the epistemological complexity of the present learning challenges they face in their lives.

The remainder of this chapter addresses each of these points in the context of the predicaments of Peter and Lynn.

**Informational Learning and Transformational Learning**

Learning aimed at increasing our fund of knowledge, at increasing our repertoire of skills, at extending already established cognitive capacities into new terrain serves the absolutely crucial purpose of deepening the resources available to an existing frame of reference. Such learning is literally in-form-ative because it seeks to bring valuable new contents into the existing form of our way of knowing.

No learning activity, discipline, or field is well nourished without continuous opportunities to engage in this kind of learning. A concrete thinker who has the capacity to hold in his mind a narrative episode in American history can also bring the same capacity to learning narratives of other peoples and continents. Certainly no passenger wants an airline pilot whose professional training was long on collaborative reflective dialogue leading to ever more complex apprehensions of the phenomena of flight but short on the technique of landing a plane in a crosswind; no patient wants a doctor well trained in such dialogue but unable to tell a benign lump from a cancerous tumor.

However, learning aimed at changes not only in what we know but changes in how we know has an almost opposite rhythm about it and comes closer to the etymological meaning of education (“leading out”). “Informative” learning involves a kind of leading in, or filling of the form (see Figure 2.1). Trans-form-ative learning puts the form itself at risk of change (and not just change but increased capacity). If one is bound by concrete thinking in the study of, say, history, then, yes, further learning of the informative sort might involve the mastery of more historical facts, events, characters, and outcomes. But further learning of a transformative sort might also involve the development of a capacity for abstract thinking so that one can ask more general, thematic questions about the facts, or consider the perspectives and biases of those who wrote the historical account creating the facts. Both kinds of learning are expansive and valuable, one within a preexisting frame of mind and the other reconstructing the very frame.

But only the latter would I call transformative or transformational. Transformation should not refer to just any kind of change, even to any kind of dramatic, consequential change. I know a ten-year-old who decided to read the entire encyclopedia, A through Z, for a summer project. His parents’ friends asked him all summer
long, in teasing admiration, “So what letter are you on now?” and listened with astonishment to his recall of facts about all things M, from magic to music. He was the talk of his neighborhood and dramatically increased his fund of content familiarities. His appetite and his recall were certainly impressive. His ability even to sustain his interest in a series of very short-term exposures was commendable. But I see nothing transformational about his learning.

Changes in one’s fund of knowledge, one’s confidence as a learner, one’s self-perception as a learner, one’s motives in learning, one’s self-esteem—these are all potentially important kinds of changes, all desirable, all worthy of teachers’ thinking about how to facilitate them. But it is possible for any or all of these changes to take place without any transformation because they could all occur within the existing form or frame of reference.

And much of the time there would be no problem whatever in this being exactly what occurs. Lynn, for example, already demonstrates the complex capacity to set boundaries, to keep separate her simultaneous relationship to Carolyn as friend and colleague so that the claims from one sphere are not inappropriately honored in another. She demonstrates the capacity to generate an internal vision that guides her purposes and allows her to sort through and make judgments about the choices, expectations, and proposals of others. Although it would certainly be possible for the underlying form of her way of knowing to undergo further transformation, it may not be necessary at the moment. She may be in greater need of learning additional skills at detecting more readily circumstances that are likely to risk such boundary violations, or how one more effectively gathers a consensus to bring to life the vision she is able intellectually to create. Such learnings could be extremely valuable, make her even more effective, increase her enjoyment of work and her circumstances—and none of that learning need be transformational.

Peter, on the other hand, would be ill-served by a kind of learning that was only informative. He is overreliant on the opinion of others, too dependent on signals from others to direct his own choices and behaviors. He could experience a kind of learning that might dramatically enhance his signal-detecting capabilities in twelve different ways. But dramatic as such changes might be I would not call them transformational because they do not give Peter the opportunity to reconstruct the very role of such signals in his life. Given his current work circumstances, if he cannot effect this change he is going to continue to have a difficult time.

Informational and transformational kinds of learning are each honorable, valuable, meritable, dignifiable activities. Each can be enhancing, necessary, and challenging for the teacher to facilitate. In given moments or contexts, a heavier weighting of one or the other may be called for.
What Form Transforms?
The Centrality of Epistemology

As the foregoing suggests, the saving specificity of a concept like transformational learning may lie in a more explicit understanding of the form we believe is undergoing some change. If there is no form there is no transformation. But what really constitutes a form?

Mezirow's term frame of reference is a useful way to engage this question. Its province is necessarily epistemological. Our frame of reference may be passionately clung to or casually held, so it clearly has an emotional or affective coloring. Our frame of reference may be an expression of our familial loyalties or tribal identifications, so it clearly has a social or interpersonal coloring. Our frame of reference may have an implicit or explicit ethical dimension, so it clearly has a moral coloring. But what is the phenomenon itself that takes on all these colorings? Mezirow, in this volume, says a frame of reference involves both a habit of mind and a point of view. Both of these suggest that, at its root, a frame of reference is a way of knowing.

"Epistemology" refers to precisely this: not what we know but our way of knowing. Attending to the epistemological inevitably involves attending to two kinds of processes, both at the heart of a concept like transformational learning. The first is what we might call meaning-forming, the activity by which we shape a coherent meaning out of the raw material of our outer and inner experiencing. Constructivism recognizes that reality does not happen preformed and waiting for us merely to copy a picture of it. Our perceiving is simultaneously an act of conceiving, of interpreting. "Percept without concept is blind," Kant said. "Our experience," Huxley said, "is less what happens to us, and more what we make of what happens to us."

The second process inherent in the epistemological is what we might call reforming our meaning-forming. This is a metaprocess that affects the very terms of our meaning-constructing. We do not only form meaning, and we do not only change our meanings; we change the very form by which we are making our meanings. We change our epistemologies.

These two processes inherent in epistemology are actually at the heart of two lines of social-scientific thought that should be in much closer conversations with each other: the educational line of thought is transformational learning; the psychological line of thought is constructive developmentalism. Constructive developmental psychology (Kegan, 1982, 1994; Piaget, 1954; Kohlberg, 1984; Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger, and Tarule, 1986) attends to the natural evolution of the forms of our meaning-constructing (hence "constructive-developmental"). A more explicit rendering of transformational learning, I suggest, attends to the deliberate efforts and designs that support changes in the learner's form of knowing. Adult educators with an interest in supporting transformational learning can look to constructive-developmental theory as a source of ideas about (1) the dynamic architecture of "that form which transforms," that is, a form of knowing; and (2) the dynamic architecture of "reforming our forms of knowing," that is, the psychological process of transformations in our knowing.

Constructive-developmental theory invites those with an interest in transformational learning to consider that a form of knowing always consists of a relationship or temporary equilibrium between the subject and the object in one's knowing. The subject-object relationship forms the cognate or core of an epistemology. That which is "object" we can look at, take responsibility for, reflect upon, exercise control over, integrate with some other way of knowing. That which is "subject" we are run by, identified with, fused with, at the effect of. We cannot be responsible for that to which we are subject. What is "object" in our knowing describes the thoughts and feelings we say we have; what is "subject" describes the thinking and feeling that has us. We "have" object; we "are" subject.

Constructive-developmental theory looks at the process it calls development as the gradual process by which what was "subject" in our knowing becomes "object." When a way of knowing moves from
a place where we are “had by it” (captive of it) to a place where we “have it,” and can be in relationship to it, the form of our knowing has become more complex, more expansive. This somewhat formal, explicitly epistemological rendering of development comes closest, in my view, to the real meaning of transformation in transformational learning theory.

Let’s consider a famous literary example of transformation in just these terms: Nora’s speech to her husband Torvald in the closing scene of Ibsen’s play “A Doll’s House.”

**NORA:** I mean, then I passed from Papa’s hands into yours. You arranged everything the way you wanted it, so that I simply took over your taste in everything—or pretended I did—I don’t really know. I think it was a little of both—first one and then the other. Now I look back on it, it’s as if I’ve been living here like a pauper, from hand to mouth. I performed tricks for you, and you gave me food and drink. But that was how you wanted it. You and Papa have done me a great wrong. It’s your fault that I have done nothing in my life.

**TORVALD:** Nora, how can you be so unreasonable and ungrateful? Haven’t you been happy here?

**NORA:** No; never. I used to think I was; but I haven’t ever been happy.

**TORVALD:** Not—not happy?

**NORA:** No. I’ve just had fun. You’ve always been very kind to me. But our home has never been anything but a playroom. I’ve been your doll-wife just as I used to be Papa’s doll-child. And the children have been my dolls. I used to think it was fun when you came in and played with me, just as they think it’s fun when I go in and play games with them. That’s all our marriage has been, Torvald.

**TORVALD:** There might be a little truth in what you say, though you exaggerate and romanticize. But from now on it’ll be different. Playtime is over. Now the time has come for education.

**NORA:** Whose education? Mine or the children’s?

**TORVALD:** Both yours and the children’s, my dearest Nora.

**NORA:** Oh, Torvald, you’re not the man to educate me into being the right wife for you.

**TORVALD:** How can you say that?

**NORA:** And what about me? Am I fit to educate the children?

**TORVALD:** Nora!

**NORA:** Didn’t you say yourself a few minutes ago that you dare not leave them in my charge?

**TORVALD:** In a moment of excitement. Surely you don’t think I meant it seriously?

**NORA:** Yes. You were perfectly right. I’m not fit to educate them. There’s something else I must do first. I must educate myself. And you can’t help me with that. It’s something I must do by myself. That’s why I’m leaving you.

**TORVALD [jumps up]:** What did you say?

**NORA:** I must stand on my own feet if I am to find out the truth about myself and about life. So I can’t go on living here with you any longer.

**TORVALD:** Nora, Nora!

**NORA:** I’m leaving you now, at once. Christine will put me up for tonight—

**TORVALD:** You’re out of your mind! You can’t do this! I forbid you!

**NORA:** It’s no use your trying to forbid me any more. I shall take with me nothing but what is mine. I don’t want anything from you, now or ever.

**TORVALD:** What kind of madness is this?
NORA: Tomorrow I shall go home—I mean, to where I was born. It'll be easiest for me to find some kind of a job there.

TORVALD: But you're blind! You have no experience of the world—

NORA: I must try to get some, Torvald.

TORVALD: But to leave your home, your husband, your children! Have you thought what people will say?

NORA: I can't help that. I only know I must do this.

TORVALD: But this is monstrous! Can you neglect your most sacred duties?

NORA: What do you call my most sacred duties?

TORVALD: Do I have to tell you? Your duties toward your husband, and your children.

NORA: I have another duty which is equally sacred.

TORVALD: You have not. What on earth could that be?

NORA: My duty towards myself.

TORVALD: First and foremost you are a wife and a mother.

NORA: I don't believe that any longer. I believe that I am first and foremost a human being, like you—or anyway, that I must try to become one. I know most people think as you do, Torvald, and I know there's something of the sort to be found in books. But I'm no longer prepared to accept what people say and what's written in books. I must think things out for myself, and try to find my own answer.

TORVALD: Do you need to ask where your duty lies in your home? Haven't you an infallible guide in such matters—your religion?

NORA: Oh, Torvald, I don't really know what religion means.

TORVALD: What are you saying?

NORA: I only know what Pastor Hansen told me when I went to confirmation. He explained that religion meant this and that. When I get away from all this and can think things out on my own, that's one of the questions I want to look into. I want to find out whether what Pastor Hansen said was right—or anyway, whether it is right for me.

TORVALD: But it's unheard of for so young a woman to behave like this! If religion cannot guide you, let me at least appeal to your conscience. I presume you have some moral feelings left? Or—perhaps you haven't? Well, answer me.

NORA: Oh, Torvald, that isn't an easy question to answer. I simply don't know. I don't know where I am in these matters. I only know that these things mean something quite different to me from what they do to you.

Note that Nora is not just coming to some new ideas, "changing her mind" in the sense that she is becoming less persuaded by formerly held ideas and more persuaded by some new set of emerging ideas. Rather, she is coming to a new set of ideas about her ideas, about where they even come from, about who authorizes them or makes them true. Her discovery is not just that she herself has some new ideas but that she has been uncritically, unawarely identified with ("subject to") external sources of ideas (her husband, her church, her culture). To be uncritically, unawarely identified with these external sources is to be unable to question or weigh the validity of these ideas because one is unable to see the sources, to take them "as object." One cannot see the sources (have them as object); rather one sees through them (is "had by" them as subject). Nora is not just rejecting the assumptions of her husband or church or culture;
she is rejecting her identification with these assumptions as truths. This process of rejection is a process of moving aspects of her knowing from subject to object. Her new “way of knowing” is not so much a matter of her new ideas, values, or beliefs (she hasn’t yet figured out what these are), but that ideas, values, and beliefs are by their very nature assumptive. In fact, it is even possible that she could eventually come to the same beliefs as those held by these external sources. The beliefs she comes to endorse might be no different, and yet a transformation would still have occurred because the form of knowing that gives rise to these beliefs has been transformed (in this case, to internal authority instead of external identification); what was “subject” in her knowing has become “object.”

This transformation, of which Nora gives us a glimpse through Ibsen’s imagination at the end of the nineteenth century, may be no less relevant at the end of the twentieth if we think of Peter’s predicament. He too is embedded in, overly defined by, and subject to external sources of value and reality definition. The implication of this line of argument is that the answer to our earlier question—What kind of transformation has to occur for Peter to understand his situation more like Lynn understands hers?—is that the form of Peter’s knowing (the balance of subject and object) would need to undergo a transformation that moves what was subject in his knowing to what is object in his knowing.

Transformational Learning as a Lifelong Phenomenon

As all good teachers know, every student comes with a “learning past” that is an important part of his or her present and future learning. Important features of this past—for adult learners especially, and their teachers—include the history of their relationship to the subject at hand and the history of their personal disposition toward the enterprise of learning itself. But for the adult educator with an interest in supporting transformational learning, an important and often overlooked feature of their students’ learning pasts is their history of prior transformations.

Although the more explicitly epistemological definition of transformative learning this chapter advances is intended to limit our definition of transformation (so that not every kind of change, even important change, constitutes transformation), it also expands our exploration of the phenomenon to the entire life span. Much of the literature on transformational learning really constitutes an exploration of what constructive-developmental theory and research identifies as but one of several gradual, epochal transformations in knowing of which persons are shown to be capable throughout life. This particular transformation, reflected in Nora’s words and the contrast between Peter’s and Lynn’s constructions of their similar predicament at work, is empirically the most widespread gradual transformation we find in adulthood, so it is not surprising that adult educators have come to focus on it. But constructive-developmental theory suggests that (a) it is not the only transformation in the form of our knowing possible in adulthood; (b) even this transformation will be better understood and facilitated if its history is better honored and its future better appreciated; and (c) we will better discern the nature of learners’ particular needs for transformational learning by better understanding not only their present epistemologies but the epistemological complexity of the present learning challenges they face in their lives.

The transformation reflected in Nora’s words, or that Peter would undergo were he to construct experience more like Lynn, is a shift away from being “made up by” the values and expectations of one’s “surround” (family, friends, community, culture) that get uncritically internalized and with which one becomes identified, toward developing an internal authority that makes choices about these external values and expectations according to one’s own self-authored belief system. One goes from being psychologically “written by” the socializing press to “writing upon” it, a shift from a socialized to a self-authoring epistemology, in the lingo of constructive-developmental
theory. (Or in the lingo of the theory of Belenky and colleagues in this volume, a shift from received learning to procedural knowing).

As pervasive and powerful as this gradual transformation may be, it is only one of several shifts in the deep underlying epistemology (the form that transforms) we use to organize meaning. Longitudinal and cross-sectional research, using a reliable interview instrument to discern what epistemologies an individual has access to (Lahey and others, 1988), identifies five distinctly different epistemologies (Kegan, 1994). As Figure 2.2 suggests, each of these can be described with respect to what is subject and what is object, and each shift entails the movement of what had been subject in the old epistemology to object in the new epistemology. Thus the basic principle of complexification of mind here is not the mere addition of new capacities (an aggregation model), nor the substitution of a new capacity for an old one (a replacement model), but the subordination of once-ruling capacities to the dominion of more complex capacities, an evolutionary model that again distinguishes transformation from other kinds of change.

An array of increasingly complex epistemologies, such as those described in Figure 2.2, works against the unhelpful tendency to see a person like Peter, who orders experience predominantly from the socialized epistemology, only in terms of what he cannot do, and to see a person like Lynn, who predominantly orders experience from the self-authoring epistemology, only in terms of what she can.

Surely any educator who wished to be helpful to Peter, especially one wishing to facilitate transformational learning, would do well to know and respect where Peter is coming from, not just where it may be valuable for him to go. A constructive-developmental perspective on transformational learning creates an image of this kind of learning over a lifetime as the gradual traversing of a succession of increasingly more elaborate bridges. Three injunctions follow from this image. First, we need to know which bridge we are on. Second, we need to know how far along the learner is in traversing that particular bridge. Third, we need to know that, if it is to be a bridge that is safe to walk across, it must be well anchored on both sides, not just the culminating side. We cannot overattend to where we want the student to be—the far side of the bridge—and ignore where the student is. If Peter is at the very beginning—the near side—of the bridge that traverses the socialized and the self-authoring epistemologies, it may be important to consider that this also means he is at the far side of a prior bridge. Only by respecting what he has already gained and what he would have to lose were he to venture forth is it likely we could help him continue his journey.

Although it is easy and tempting to define Peter by what he does not or cannot do (especially in comparison to Lynn), it is also true that his socialized epistemology permits him all the following capacities: he can think abstractly, construct values and ideals, introspect, subconsciously his short-term interests to the welfare of a relationship, and orient to and identify with the expectations of those social groups and interpersonal relationships of which he wishes to feel himself a part.

From the vantage point of empirical research we know that it ordinarily takes the first two decades of living to develop these complex capacities and some people have not developed them even by then (Kegan, 1982, 1994). Many parents, for example, would be overjoyed were their teenagers to have these capacities. Consider as an example parents' wish that their children be trustworthy and hold up their end of family agreements, such as abiding by a curfew on Saturday night. What appears to be a call for a specific behavior ("Be home by midnight or phone us") or the acquisition of a specific knowledge ("Know that it is important to us that you do what you say you will") actually turns out to be something more epistemological. Parents do not simply want their kids to get themselves home by midnight on Saturday night; they want them to do it for a specific reason. If their kids abide by a curfew only because the parents have an effective enough monitoring system to detect if they do not and a sufficiently noxious set of consequences to impose when they do not, the parents would ultimately be disappointed
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
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| PERCEPTIONS  
  Fantasy  
SOCIAL PERCEPTIONS/  
  IMPULSES | Movement  
  Sensation | Single point/  
  immediate/atomistic |
| CONCRETE  
  Actuality  
  Data, cause-and-effect  
POINT OF VIEW  
  Role-concept  
  Simple reciprocity (tit-for-tat)  
ENDURING DISPOSITIONS  
  Needs, preferences  
  Self-concept | Perceptions  
  Social perceptions  
  Impulses | Durable category |
| ABSTRACTIONS  
  Ideality  
  Inference, generalization  
  Proposition  
  Hypothesis, proposition  
  Ideals, values  
  MUTUALITY/INTERPERSONALISM  
  Role consciousness  
  Mutual reciprocity  
  INNER STATES  
  Subjectivity, self-consciousness | Concrete  
  Point of view  
  Enduring dispositions  
  Needs, preferences | Cross-categorical  
  Trans-categorical |

**Figure 2.2. Five Increasingly Complex Epistemologies.**
even though the kids are behaving correctly. Parents of teens want to resign from the role of “parent police.” They want their kids to hold up their end of the agreement, not simply because they can frighten them into doing so but because the kids have begun to intrinsically prioritize the importance of being trustworthy. This is not first of all a claim on their kids’ behavior; it is a claim on their minds. Nor will the mere acquisition of the knowledge content (“It is important to my parents that I do what I say I will”) be sufficient to bring the child home by midnight. Many nonbehaving teens know precisely what their parents value. They just do not themselves hold these values! They hold them extrinsically, as land mines they need to take account of, to maneuver around so they do not explode.

What the parents are really hoping for from their teens is a transformation, a shift away from an epistemology oriented to self-interest, the short term, and others-as-supplies-to-the-self (the Instrumental Mind in Figure 2.2). This epistemology they ordinarily develop in late childhood. Rather they need to relativize or subordinate their own immediate interests on behalf of the interests of a social relationship, the continued participation in which they value more highly than the gratification of an immediate need. When they make this epistemological shift, sustaining a mutual bond of trust with their parents becomes more important than partying till dawn.

And when adolescents do make this shift (to the Socialized Mind in Figure 2.2), interestingly, we consider them to be responsible. For a teen the very capacity to be “written upon,” to be “made up by,” constitutes responsibility. It is Peter’s misfortune that this perfectly dignifiable and complicated epistemology is a better match with the hidden curriculum of adolescence than that of modern adulthood, which makes demands on us to win some distance from the socializing press and actually regards people who uncritically internalize and identify with the values and expectations of others as insufficiently responsible! Parents who, for example, cannot set limits on their children, who cannot defy them, or who are susceptible to being “made up” by their wishes we regard as irresponsible. Nora’s words suggest just this discovery of a whole different “responsibility curriculum.” After years of responsibly meeting the expectations her father, husband, priest, and culture had for her as adolescent and adult woman, she has come to the challenges of a new course of study: the responsibility she has to herself. To master this new curriculum she needs, as Peter needs, a new epistemology. But this does not mean that she and Peter did not earlier undergo an important transformation (to the socialized epistemology), and it does not mean they did not learn well or did not learn enough. In fact, by all accounts they were both very successful learners. Their present difficulties arise because the complexity of the “life curriculum” they face has gotten qualitatively more challenging. In the words of Ronald Heifetz (1995), what they face are not technical challenges (the sort that can be addressed by what I call “informational learning”), but adaptive challenges, the kind that require not merely knowing more but knowing differently. For this reason they are in need of supports to transformational learning.

The particular epistemological transformation Nora is beginning and Peter needs help to begin—the transformation to a self-authoring frame of reference (to use Mezirow’s term)—is the particular transformation we often find unwittingly privileged in writings on adult learning. In Chapter One, Mezirow talks about our need to pierce a taken-for-granted relationship to the assumptions that surround us. “We must become critically reflective of the assumptions of the person communicating” to us, he says. “We need to know whether the person who gives us a diagnosis about our health is a trained medical worker, or that one who gives us direction at work is authorized to do so.” In essence, Mezirow says, we need to “take as object . . . what is taken for granted, like conventional wisdom; [or] a particular religious worldview,” rather than being subject to it. This is not only a call for an epistemological shift, it is a call for a particular epistemological shift, the move from the socialized to the self-authoring mind. This is a call that makes nothing but good sense
provided the adult learner is not too far from the entrance to this particular epistemological bridge (nor has already traversed it).

And even when it does make good curricular sense we must be careful not to create learning designs that get out too far ahead of the learner. For example, when Mezirow says transformational educators want to support the learner's ability "to negotiate his or her own purposes, values, feelings, and meanings rather than simply to act on those of others," he again sounds the call for the move toward self-authoring, and he quite understandably invokes a model of education that will support this shift: "The generally accepted model of adult education involves a transfer of authority from the educator to the learners." But even when this particular shift is the appropriate transformational bridge for our student, all of us, as adult educators, need help in discerning how rapidly or gradually this shift in authority should optimally take place for that student, which is a function of how far he or she is along this particular bridge.

The shift in authority to which Mezirow refers reflects the familiar call in the adult education literature for us to regard and respect all our adult students as self-directed learners, almost by virtue of their adult status alone. Gerald Grow (1991) defines self-directed learners as those who are able to "examine themselves, their culture and their milieu in order to understand how to separate what they feel from what they should feel, what they value from what they should value, and what they want from what they should want. They develop critical thinking, individual initiative, and a sense of themselves as co-creators of the culture that shapes them."

But when the adult education experts tell us they want students to "understand how to separate what they feel from what they should feel, what they value from what they should value, and what they want from what they should want," do they take seriously enough the possibility that when the socialized mind dominates our meaning-making, what we should feel is what we do feel, what we should value is what we do value, and what we should want is what we do want? Their goal therefore may not be a matter of getting students merely to identify and value a distinction between two parts that already exist, but of fostering a qualitative evolution of mind that actually creates the distinction. Their goal may involve something more than the cognitive act of "distinction," a bloodless word that fails to capture the human wrenching of the self from its cultural surround. Although this goal is perfectly suited to assisting adults in meeting the bigger culturewide "curriculum" of the modern world, educators may need a better understanding of how ambitious their aspiration is and how costly the project may seem to their students.

Adult students are not all automatically self-directing merely by virtue of being adults, or even trained to become so. Educators seeking self-direction from their adult students are not merely asking them to take on new skills, modify their learning style, or increase their self-confidence. They are asking many of them to change the whole way they understand themselves, their world, and the relationship between the two. They are asking many of them to put at risk the loyalties and devotions that have made up the very foundation of their lives. We acquire personal authority, after all, only by relativizing—that is, only by fundamentally altering—our relationship to public authority. This is a long, often painful voyage, and one that, much of the time, may feel more like mutiny than a merely exhilarating (and less self-conflicted) expedition to discover new lands.

Note how lost at sea Peter becomes when his long-time mentor unwittingly assumes his capacity for self-directed learning. Anderson no doubt sees himself as an emancipatory, empowering employer-as-adult-educator who scrupulously and consistently stands by his transfer of authority, taking care not to undermine Peter by taking on business that should properly be referred to him and refusing even Peter’s veiled requests to step in and once again provide a map and a destination. What Anderson sees as his testimony to Peter's capacity for self-direction, Peter sees as a bewildering vacuum of externally supplied expectation and an indirect message from his boss that he no longer cares that much what happens to Peter. I have
heard countless complaints about Anderson's ineffectiveness as a good leader, that he has asked too much of Peter all at once; and yet when we have the opportunity to examine our own leadership as adult educators few of us can escape the conclusion that we have ourselves—on many occasions with the most emancipatory of intentions—been Andersons in our own classrooms.

Finally, an array of epistemologies such as that depicted in Figure 2.2 reminds us that even as our designs can get too far ahead of where some of our students are, so they can also fall too far behind; even as we can fail to do Peter justice by seeing him only in terms of what he cannot do, we can fail to do justice to Lynn's learning opportunities by seeing her only in terms of those capacities she has already developed. The move toward the self-authoring mind—valorized though it may unwittingly be in the subtexts of our aspirations for transformational learning—is not the only fundamental epistemological shift in adulthood. Nor are the learning challenges that call for the self-authoring mind the only challenges adults of this new century will face.

The self-authoring mind is equipped, essentially, to meet the challenges of modernism. Unlike traditionalism, in which a fairly homogeneous set of definitions of how one should live is consistently promulgated by the cohesive arrangements, models, and codes of the community or tribe, modernism is characterized by ever-proliferating pluralism, multiplicity, and competition for our loyalty to a given way of living. Modernism requires that we be more than well socialized; we must also develop the internal authority to look at and make judgments about the expectations and claims that bombard us from all directions. Yet adult learners today and tomorrow encounter not only the challenges of modernism but of postmodernism as well. Postmodernism calls on us to win some distance even from our own internal authorities so that we are not completely captive of our own theories, so that we can recognize their incompleteness, so that we can even embrace contradictory systems simultaneously. These challenges—a whole different "cur-

riculum"—show up in as private a context as our conflicted relationships, where we may or may not be able to hold the embattled sides internally rather than projecting one side onto our adversary; and in as public a context as higher education itself, where we may or may not be able to see that our intellectual disciplines are inevitably, to some extent, ideological procedures for creating and validating what counts as real knowledge. Lynn too, it seems, has further bridges to cross. She has her own particular needs for transformational learning, however different from Peter's these may be. She challenges educators to create yet another set of learning designs should they seek to support her own bigger becoming.

"The spirit," Hegel wrote in The Phenomenology of Mind, "is never at rest but always engaged in ever progressive motion, in giving itself a new form." How might we understand transformational learning differently—and our opportunities as educators—were we to understand the restless, creative processes of development itself, in which all our students partake before, during, and after their participation in our classrooms?

References